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Abstract
The establishment of trust relationships to a computing platform relies on validation processes. Validation allows an external entity
to build trust in the expected behaviour of the platform based on provided evidence of the platform’s configuration. In a process like
remote attestation, the ’trusted’ platform submits verification data created during a start up process. These data consist of hardware-
protected values of platform configuration registers, containing nested measurement values, e.g., hash values, of loaded or started
components. Commonly, the register values are created in linear order by a hardware-secured operation. Fine-grained diagnosis of
components, based on the linear order of verification data and associated measurement logs, is not optimal. We propose a method
to use tree-formed verification data to validate a platform. Component measurement values represent leaves, and protected registers
represent roots of a hash tree. We describe the basic mechanism of validating a platform using tree-formed measurement logs
and root registers and show an logarithmic speed-up for the search of faults. Secure creation of a tree is possible using a limited
number of hardware-protected registers and a single protected operation. In this way, the security of tree-formed verification data
is maintained.
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1. Introduction
In a nutshell, the process of building trust in computing plat-
forms follows a unique pattern [1], common to most architec-
tures of trusted platforms. During start up of the platform, all
components are measured by a protected entity on the platform
before they are loaded and executed. The generation of a chain
of trust is an important concept for a Trusted Computing Sys-
tem. This chain must extend without gaps from system boot up
to the current system state, including all executed instructions
and programs. Every component is required to measure and
report the following component before executing it. Measure-
ment of the direct successor prevents unmonitored execution
of code between measurement and actual execution. The start
of the measurement process, that is, the taking and recording of
measurements, is protected by a Root of Trust for Measurement
(RoTM), which, as a part of the trusted computing base of the
platform, is unconditionally trusted, and may be endowed with
security through hardware protection, and trust through certifi-
cation, for instance.
This is the model process of start up of a trusted platform via
a transitive chain of trust according to the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG). It comes in two variants: In [2], authenticated
boot is specified for PC clients, whereas [3] specifies secure
boot for mobile platforms. The difference is essentially that
secure boot adds a local verification and enforcement engine
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that lets components start only if their measurements are equal
to trusted reference values.
The mentioned “measurement” of system components can
be implemented for instance by computing a digest value over
code and configuration data, e.g., a SHA-1 hash value. The
measurement values are recorded in a Stored Measurement Log
(SML) without particular protection. However, additional data
is compiled from the measurement values by a protected opera-
tion and stored in protected storage, so-called Platform Config-
uration Registers (PCRs). These data identify, after completion
of secure start up, the platform’s state uniquely. PCRs provide
information about a system’s state with unconditional security.
In particular, they are secure independently of the SML, which,
according to TCG standards, has no particular protection on the
platform. PCR values are cryptographically bound to the con-
tents of the SML by hash-chaining inside a secure environment.
This way to use PCR values to secure the SML is based on the
technique introduced by Schneier and Kelsey for securing audit
logs on untrusted machines [4, 5]. In fact, it is a simplification,
since only the last element of the hash chain is kept in a PCR,
while the SML normally contains only the measurement values.
Integrity measurement using the TPM is implemented in the In-
tegrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [6] as a Linux kernel
module to measure the integrity using the TPM and to generate
a linear SML.
The main intended use of PCRs and SMLs is validation of the
state of a platform by an entity, internal or external. For this,
signed PCR values, may be sent to that entity, the validator.
The signature over the PCR values, using Attestation Identity
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Keys (AIKs) attests to the hardware protection of the PCR value
by a TPM. After following this procedure, defined by the TCG
in the attestation protocols [7], the validator may compare PCR
values with a table of known good states, or check the integrity
of the SML and analyse it entry by entry. It is envisaged by
TCG, that validation may eventually be used to take remedial
steps on trusted platforms, for instance upon first network or
service access, as designed in the specifications of the Trusted
Network Connect working group of the TCG [8].
The linear, sequential structure of the SML has some known
limitations regarding flexibility and efficiency. In the present
paper it is proposed to extend SMLs by data that is organised as
a binary tree, more precisely a Merkle hash-tree [9, 10]. We call
this a tree-formed SML. Anticipating the following, the main
advantages of tree-formed SMLs are as follows: A logarith-
mic improvement in the search of failures (components and/or
devices which are not in a known good configuration) allows
for efficient verification of many more attached devices. This
increases the scalability of validation to a point that it could
be extended to networks rather than just single systems. Also,
a tree-formed SML allows corrupted or compromised compo-
nents to be found in a hierarchically structured process with a
defined granularity.
The paper is organised as follows: To provide a conceptual
background, Section 2 reviews the linear SML data structure,
how it is generated and used in attestation to validate a plat-
form. An analysis of efficiency and security of the linear SML
serves as reference for later comparison with the proposed tree
formed structure. On the basis of that, Section 3 lays out the
definition of the tree-formed data structure and its procedural
use for platform validation. Analysis in parallel with that for
the linear SML shows the benefits of the tree-formed approach
with regard to efficiency and a more flexible implementation of
security through platform validation. A secure generation algo-
rithm for tree-formed SMLs and associated PCR values, main-
taining the security assumptions of the linear, standard case is
exhibited in Section 4 Section 5 discusses implementation op-
tions for tree-formed SML within the scope of existing tech-
nology. We present a proof-of-concept implementation in an
emulated Trusted Computing environment and show results of
performance experiments. The idea of hash trees is a classic,
however it has not been used for the validation of platforms,
as is shown in Section 6, where we position the present contri-
bution in the context of related work. Section 7 concludes the
paper with a discussion on applicability of the presented ideas
and outlook to further work.
2. Linear Chained Verification Data
Although Trusted Computing is the paradigm we are starting
from, we take the opportunity to conceptually abstract slightly
from this concrete case and to introduce a common terminol-
ogy. This allows a clearer comparison of the linear chained
SML with the proposed tree-formed data structure. Further-
more, we argue that the general concepts are applicable more
broadly than what is in the scope of TCG. Examples will be
provided in the discussion of Section 7.
V(N)
mN
· · ·V(1)V(0)
m1
Figure 1: Linear Chained SML and PCR generation.
2.1. Data Structure and Generation Procedure
We call data collected on a platform which is later to be sub-
mitted to a validator, and which identifies the platform state
uniquely collectively verification data. The set of measure-
ments, e.g. hash values, of system components stored in the
SML is the standard example of verification data. To elevate the
assurance level of validation, additional, protected verification
data may be created. Protected verification data cryptographi-
cally protects the bulk of verification data and is itself protected
by some unconditionally trusted functions and resources of the
platform, i.e., by a root of trust. According to TCG, protected
verification data is stored in Platform Configuration Registers
(PCRs, a minimum of 16 according to version 1.1 of the spec-
ification, at least 24 in version 1.2) in the TPM, where they
can only be accessed by authorised commands. TCG specifies
computation of protected verification data via the extend opera-
tion of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM, [11]), respectively,
the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM, [12]) from the component
measurements. The extend operation builds a linearly ordered,
nested chain of hash values, akin to the Merkle-Damgård trans-
form, as follows:
Vi(k)← Vi(k − 1)  mk def= H (Vi(k − 1)‖mk) , (1)
where Vi denotes a verification data register, i.e., a particular
instance of a piece of protected verification data (i = 0, . . . , 23
for PCRs), H is a collision-resistant hash function (SHA-1 in
case of the TPM), and mk = H(data) is the k-th measurement
value taken in the start up sequence. This operation is carried
out inside the secure execution environment of the TPM which
is assumed to afford essentially the same protection level as
the PCRs themselves. Figure 1 shows the linear chained state
structure of a verification data register V , created by the extend
operation. The intermediate states are transient, i.e., they are
normally not recorded in the SML. Only the final state V(N) is
recorded and protected in the register, which is indicated by the
circle boundary around it.
2.2. Validation With Linear Verification Data
To validate a platform, its protected verification data is sent
in an attestation message to the validator. The attestation mes-
sage bears a digital signature with a certificate that attests to the
assurance level provided by the protected verification data. In
the case of the TPM, the signature using an AIK certificate at-
tests to the fact that the signed PCR values have been created
and protected by a genuine TPM. See [13] for further details.
Alongside with the attestation message, the SML is commonly
also submitted as subsidiary data. We call this data collection
validation data. The validator is then able, in principle, to as-
sess the trustworthiness of the platform to any desired gran-
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ularity, limited only by the total information conveyed during
validation.
Validation proceeds in an hierarchical manner from attes-
tation message signature verification, over assessment of pro-
tected verification data, to assessment of unprotected verifica-
tion data: After verifying the attestation message, the validator
compares protected verification data with reference data, i.e.,
known values of protected verification data, e.g., PCR values of
known good states of the platform. If the protected verification
data is found in the validator’s library, the platform state is iden-
tified and the validation process ends. If not, the validator needs
next to check the integrity of the unprotected verification data
by retracing the process of creation of the protected verification
data, i.e., recalculate the state V(N) from the measurement val-
ues contained in the SML. If that succeeds, the validator may
proceed to look at single entries of the SML to detect faults in
the system configuration.
2.2.1. Fault Detection
The validator may now compare each single data element of
verification data with reference values of single system com-
ponents, called Reference Integrity Measurements [3] in TCG
parlance. If known good reference values are found for each
entry in the SML, the validator concludes that the system state
differs from a known good state only by the order sequence in
which measurements where entered into the SML. Assessment
of this result may depend on policy. The opposite case, i.e., one
or more entries in the SML differ from their reference values,
are what we denote as faults of the corresponding components.
Detection of faults with linear chained verification data al-
ways requires retracing of a protected verification data value,
i.e., it has at least the computational complexity of N extend
operations (SHA-1 operations for PCR values), when the SML
contains N measurements. One way to improve efficiency is
to extend the library of known reference values of protected
verification data, but this strategy has limits for complex sys-
tems, imposed by combinatorics. Furthermore, fault detection
requires N searches for reference values, equal to a particular
one of the SML entries.
2.2.2. Tamper Detection
Tamper is anything which breaks the integrity of unprotected
verification data with respect to the protected verification data,
i.e., in the linear case, breaks the hash chain. This may or may
not be the result of manipulation by an attacker. The validator
may detect tamper only by recalculating the complete chain of
states V(i) from the submitted mk, k = 1, . . . ,N in the SML us-
ing (1) and compare the result V(N) with the received protected
verification data register value V ′(N). However, the validator
cannot even detect the position(s) of tampering in the SML, i.e.,
determine the ordered list of original measurement values [mk]
which have been replaced by tamper values [m′k]. Some im-
provement can be achieved, if also the intermediate states V(k)
are transmitted as validation data in an extended SML. In this
case, the validator can retrace the linear chain backwards to find
the last position of tamper, i.e., the largest k for which a received
measurement is in [m′k].
z
x y
Figure 2: Generic inner nodes in tree-formed verification data.
3. Tree-Formed Verification Data
The discussion above shows the clear-cut limitations of linear
chained verification data: a) Faults can be discovered by linear
search only, and b) tamper detection is limited to a binary de-
cision. At best, i.e., in the case that the SML is augmented by
all intermediate verification data register states, determination
of the ‘last point of tamper’, i.e., the latest element in the SML
which can be proven to be manipulated, becomes possible.
Thus, the state-of-the art of verification data, created by lin-
early chaining extend operations, is only of limited value for re-
mote diagnostics of a platform, and advanced management such
as component-wise remediation. The space complexity of real
world SMLs with many hundreds, or thousands, of measured
components, makes sifting it through for components which
fail validation, i.e., for which measurement value differs from a
“good” reference value, costly.
The point b) also yields a hint to further improvements by
further extensions of validation data. Here we propose one such
extension which is a particular combination of increased capa-
bilities with efficiency, namely to change the topology of the
SML for validation to one or more binary trees with roots pro-
tected by verification data registers.
3.1. Data Structure
Before beginning to construct binary tree-formed verification
data, we capture the guiding principle, abstracted from the lin-
ear chain example of Section 2.
Validation Assumption. Platform validation data and process
satisfies:
V1 Validation data contains sufficient information to allow for
independent, cryptographic proof of the assurance level of
the integrity of protected verification data.
V2 Protected verification data contains sufficient information
to allow for independent, cryptographic proof of the same
assurance level of the integrity of all verification data.
V3 Reference data for at least one reference state of a plat-
form for all or parts of verification data is available to the
validator.
V1 is just an abstraction of the semantics of the attestation
message. V2 and V3 have a more specific meaning in the
present context. For tree-formed verification data, V2 directly
entails the requirement of cryptographic binding of nodes in an
upward direction. A natural implementation of this is by a hash
tree in which the generic inner node configuration of Figure 2
is related by the operation
z = x  y def= H (x‖y) . (2)
3
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Figure 3: Generic tree-formed verification data of depth 3.
To fully satisfy V2, the procedure by which the cryptographic
binding is achieved on the platform needs to satisfy defined se-
curity requirements to achieve the desired assurance level. This
is symbolised by the use of ‘’ for the extend operation. A con-
crete procedure to achieve the same assurance level as for PCRs
is described in Section 4. Note that the extend operation is non-
commutative, i.e., the resulting binary tree structure is left-right
ordered, or bi-coloured in mathematical terms.
Figure 3 shows the generic structure of a tree-formed SML
of depth d = 3 with component measurements at the leaves and
a protected verification data register V at the root. In this ex-
ample, the number of measurements is a power of 2. Section 4
describes a method to “fill up” a tree-formed SML when this is
not the case.
The basic concept of tree-formed verification data readily ex-
tends to n-ary trees and even general trees of non-uniform arity.
However, at every node with arity higher than 2, some loss of
granularity of semantics will occur, since the n children at such
a node form a linear hash chain of verification data, incurring
the drawbacks described in Section 2.2.
3.2. Validation With Tree-Formed Verification Data
The validation strategy for tree-formed verification data de-
scribed in this section exploits all available information at every
tree node. The discussion proceeds in parallel with the linear
chained case for easy comparison. In Section 3.2.3, the aver-
age computational cost is calculated in relation to the number,
respectively, relative share of failed measurements. First, fault
detection is described in the process of diagnostic validation in
Section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 describes the extended capabilities
of tree-formed data for tamper detection. Section 3.2.3 presents
quantitative performance estimates for diagnostic validation for
a simple statistical model of fault distribution.
g
g g
(a)
b
b g
b
g b
b
b b
(b)
Figure 4: Classification of node configurations relating to fault detection with
tree-formed verification data.
3.2.1. Fault Detection
The aim of diagnostic validation is to find the subset of fault
leaves. For the concrete instantiation of V3 for diagnostic vali-
dation, we assume that the validator uses a complete reference
tree for comparison of inner nodes and leaves. Then, validation
can start from the root of the tree, i.e., a protected verification
data register value V , traversing the tree downward. This yields
the leaf set of components for which measurements differ from
reference values. In traversing the tree, a depth-first search with
pruning is applied, and decisions are taken at every branching
node. The tree values at a node and its two children are com-
pared with the reference tree values of the same node positions,
and the results are noted as g (good) for agreement and b (bad)
for discrepancy. In this notation, the situations shown in Fig-
ure 4 can occur (in the absence of tamper as assumed in this
subsection).
In case (a), the whole subtree below this parent node is val-
idated positively, and traversal ends at this node. In the cases
(b), the parent node is recalculated by the validator applying the
extend operation to the child node values, to check the integrity
of the parent node. Validation proceeds to the next tree level,
traversing the subtrees where bad values are found, i.e., left,
right, or both subtrees in (b), respectively. The unique property
of diagnostic validation is that it finds all faults with untampered
measurement values in untampered subtrees.
3.2.2. Tamper Detection
If, during diagnostic validation, the value of a node recalcu-
lated from its children does not match the value at the parent
node, this indicates a tamper in one of the subtrees of which
those children are the roots. Which node, or set of nodes, was
actually tampered with, cannot be determined with certainty.
Therefore, tamper detection is analogous to the best-effort re-
stricted localisation of (the last) tamper position for the lin-
ear chain (extended by intermediate verification data register
states), which was described in Section 2.2.2.
However, for tree-formed verification data, there are more
cases of tamper detection, which occur in the configurations
Fig. 5 (c) of nodes shown in Figure 5. It should be noted that
this detection takes place without recalculating an extend op-
eration, because the shown triplets have only one bad value,
which cannot occur. The last situation, Fig. 5 (d), only occurs
when the binary tree is incomplete, and a right branch is null.
Then, as a convention, value x must equal value y, in which case
traversal proceeds to the left, and otherwise tamper is detected
at this node.
g
b g
g
g b
g
b b
b
g g
(c)
x
y nil
(d)
Figure 5: Classification of node configurations relating to tamper detection with
tree-formed verification data.
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Let us compare the impact of tamper on fault detection for
the linear and tree-formed case. Since tamper in the linear
SML cannot be localised, a failure to reproduce the PCR value
also means that diagnostic validation becomes impossible, and
failed components cannot be distinguished from good ones. For
tree-formed verification data, the situation is much better. If a
subtree is identified, where manipulation of the SML is sus-
pected, the complement of it in the verification data tree can
still be validated for fault detection.
3.2.3. Efficiency
For diagnostic validation, a significant speed-up in determin-
ing the set of failed components, may be expected by the binary
search strategy. A principal advantage of validating tree-formed
SMLs is that subtrees with a correct root can be discarded from
further search for failed components. In this section we lay out
a simple, probabilistic model to quantitatively assess the per-
formance of tree validation. We assume that recalculating the
extend (hash) operations is the dominant cost factor to estimate
validation complexity, while comparisons are cheap. Assume a
random, i.i.d. set of fault leave measurement values.
When visiting an inner parent node which differs from the
corresponding node in the reference tree, i.e., a bad parent node,
one of the situations in Fig. 4 (b), or the rightmost configuration
of Fig. 5 (c) is encountered. In the latter case, no recalculation
of the parent node needs to be performed since tamper is di-
rectly detected. The subtree with configuration Fig. 5 (c) is
discarded from further traversal, since it cannot be assumed to
yield trustworthy information about faults. In this case, further
steps depend on the validator’s policy. The node configurations
Fig. 4 (b) are the ones which require re-calculation of the par-
ents from the children by , to confirm that the configuration,
which is unknown from the validator’s reference tree, is au-
thentic. The subtrees whose roots are good children of the bad
parent node under scrutiny, are discarded from further traver-
sal. Note that this procedure implicitly excludes the subtrees
with root configuration Fig. 4 (a) and the three left configura-
tions of Fig. 5 (c) from further traversal. They correspond to
“known good” subtrees with untampered roots. These subtrees
may be considered in further forensic evaluation of the SML
tree, wherever this makes sense.
Summarising, we see that diagnostic validation requires to
visit and perform an extend operation at all bad inner nodes
in the union of all paths from failed (bad) leaves to the root,
i.e., one hash operation for each bad node which is not directly
recognised as tampered by being in the rightmost configuration
of Fig. 5 (c). Therefore it is sufficient for a first-best complex-
ity analysis to assume a tamper-free, full tree of depth d, and a
subset of i.i.d. bad leaves constituting a fraction f ∈ [0, 1] of all
leaves. The number of bad leaves is 2d f . The cost of diagnos-
tic validation is dominated by the expected number Einner( f ) of
bad inner nodes. This number can be calculated as shown in
Section Appendix B.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of the 2d − 1 total inner nodes,
for d = 16, at which a hash operation will occur under the
assumptions above. This represents the number of hash oper-
ations which are necessary to determine the bad components
Figure 6: Expected fraction of bad inner nodes on random distribution of 2d f
bad leaves for d = 16.
with certainty. The reference case of a linear SML requires 2d
hash operations to recalculate the final PCR value. This case is
roughly represented by the upper ordinate axis of Figure 6.
When the computational cost of comparisons to reference
values is taken into account, the situation is slightly different.
Tree traversal for diagnostic validation descends along the bad
inner nodes which fail comparison with the reference tree’s cor-
responding inner node. For that, both children of a bad inner
node have to be compared in every case, so that the complex-
ity in terms of comparisons is twice the number Einner( f ). The
linear SML requires all 2d measurements to be compared with
reference values.
If h is the cost of a hash operation at the validator, and c the
cost of a comparison of two hash values (160 Bit for SHA-1),
then the total validation cost of the linear case is 2d(h + c). This
is the least effort to obtain the same information from a linear
SML as by diagnostic validation of a tree-formed SML. For the
tree-formed SML on the other hand (including the root in the
count), the cost is (Einner( f )+1)(2c+h). Tree-formed diagnostic
validation is more efficient than validation of the linear chain if
Einner( f ) + 1
2d
≤ h + c
h + 2c
=
λ + 1
2λ + 1
,
where λ = c/h  1. With a very generous margin, λ < 0.01,
which yields a bound of 0.99 for the r.h.s. Then, for d = 16,
tree-formed validation is expected to be more efficient for frac-
tions f of bad leaves as high as 85%.
We see that diagnostic validation of tree-formed verification
data always performs better in terms of hash operations than
with a linear chain, and outmatches the linear chain even for
large fractions of bad components, under reasonable assump-
tions, and becomes vastly advantageous for small fractions of
failed components.
It can be expected that tree validation is yet more efficient
when the bad leaves are non-uniformly distributed, e.g., exhibit
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clustering. While we have directly compared linear and diag-
nostic tree validation, it should be noted that linear validation
becomes impossible if the recalculation of the final PCR fails,
since then, comparison of single measurements does not yield
reliable information — each measurement could be faked in the
SML to hide the one which broke the hash chain. In conclusion,
the principal, semantic advantage of tree-formed validation data
comes about even at decreased computational complexity for
the validator.
3.3. Extensions for Efficiency and Augmented Functionality
Unlike the linear chain, tree-formed verification data has a
natural hierarchical structure, namely subtrees of a verification
data tree, which opens paths for increased functionality. A par-
ticular problem of validation (linear and tree-formed) is com-
binatorial: It may be difficult in practice to keep reference data
of a whole platform. Such data may be large and depend sen-
sitively on platform configuration, for instance load orders. In
fact, since the Merkle-Damgard transform used for the extend
operation is neither commutative nor associative (unlike some
proposed multi-set hash functions [14]), the PCR values of lin-
ear chains as well as the tree root values depend on the exact
measurement sequence. This is a principal, even desired from a
security viewpoint, feature of this transformation, reflecting the
ability to detect the smallest changes in input data according
to assumption V2. This information-preserving feature of the
Merkle-Damgard transform entails, however, complexity in the
interpretation of the contained information, in particular, com-
binatorial growth of reference data bases.
As one approach to the problem, the validator could keep
a database of known good subtree root values of subtrees of
various depths, instead of a large number of complete reference
trees. These values may be stored as pairs (r, h), where r is the
node value of the subtree root and h is the depth of the subtree.
The depth h ranges from the depth d of the full SML tree to 0,
where d = 0 means that the corresponding reference value is
actually a leaf. When reaching a certain level ` in diagnostic
tree traversal, the validator compares, by breadth-first search,
the node values of the received SML tree at this level to the
known good values in the level set
{(r, h) | h = d − `}. (3)
Every subtree in the received tree-formed verification data with
a root equal to one of the elements in the level set can then
be discarded from further traversal. The validator could as well
apply different search strategies using the subtree root database,
e.g., look for known good subtree roots in the received verifica-
tion data tree first, and then verify them along their paths to the
full tree’s root.
Practically, subtree roots would be chosen such that they cor-
respond to subsystems of a system, for which the start up se-
quence is less likely to change than for the whole platform.
Further extensions are rather abundant. For instance, the val-
idator may dynamically feed the reference tree database by in-
teractive learning based on previous platform validation results.
One possibility is to perform diagnostic validation the first time
a platform validates, and generate known good subtrees from
subsequences of leaf measurements which correspond to a good
platform configuration according to the validator’s component
(i.e. leaf) reference values and policy. When more and more
platforms validate, the validator can then build a statistically
weighted database of known good subtrees and platform con-
figurations according to criteria such as commonality and risk
(associated to configurations). Frequently appearing subtrees
may be searched for first, for instance.
The full power of using subtrees can be unleashed by com-
bining them with well-known concepts of certification by
trusted third parties (TTP). Platforms may obtain digital cer-
tificates for subtree roots from such TTPs, which may for in-
stance represent certification authorities for software modules.
Such subtree certificates may be included in a verification data
tree supplanting the corresponding subtrees. These concepts are
further described in [15].
Finally, we cursorily touch on some generic (i.e., applying to
trees and linear chains alike) methods to alleviate the combina-
torial problem.
• Pre- or post-ordering of the measurement sequence during
start-up. Either, a known order is applied before the mea-
surements are effected (pre-ordering), which results in a
rigged formation of verification data, or the measurement
process is left untouched and ordering is applied later, on
the completed verification data, in some secure way (post-
ordering). Both approaches may incur security and practi-
cal problems.
• Communicating sequencing to the validator. The platform
may transmit a sequence of component identifiers, indi-
cating the sequencing of all or part of the measurements.
In the case of trees this may already help the validator
to find reference values of subtrees, since certain subse-
quences of identifiers may be used as keys to the subtree
root database.
• Application of sort criteria, such as lexicographic, fault
probability, etc., to the methods of pre- or post-ordering.
4. Secure Generation of Tree-Formed Verification Data
In this section, we show a practical solution for the problem
of creating tree-formed verification data maintaining assump-
tion V2, using only a limited number of protected verification
data registers to securely generate one root verification value.
Secure creation of verification data which represents root
nodes of hash trees poses a particular problem. In the nor-
mal extend operation of a TPM used for linear chaining, only
the measurement value taken by the RoTM on a component,
and the current PCR value are used, and the operation itself is
carried out in the hardware protected TPM. Thus, in particu-
lar, previous measurements already processed must not be used
in the SML generation process, since they would have to be
fetched from the SML which is not assumed to be protected.
This would compromise assumption V2.
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For tree-formed verification data representing a hash tree,
where adding a new leaf always affects d − 2 inner nodes of
the tree, where d is the tree’s depth, the challenge is to gen-
erate tree-formed verification data, from sequentially arriving
measurement values, exclusively inside a limited number of
hardware protected registers (PCRs), using only a single leaf
measurement value as input. Concurrently we are looking for
a compact algorithm which lends itself to implementation on
secure hardware and would potentially require only minimal
changes on existing TPM architecture.
It should be noted that every reference to the concrete embod-
iments of Trusted Computing specified by the TCG made in this
paper, in particular TPM operations, PCRs, and SML, are ex-
amples for possible realisations of the presented concepts. The
algorithms and procedures can in principle be applied to every
security technology with the minimum capabilities which are
used by them (discussed in the Section 4.3 on the complexity
of the procedure).
4.1. Tree Formation Procedure
In our proposed solution, one of the hardware protected reg-
istersV def= {V1, . . . ,Vr}, e.g., PCRs, contains the root of the final
tree. The tree is chosen to be binary, to keep the algorithm as
compact as possible and to provide a fine grained detection of
failed components. The leaves are carrying the measurement
values, while the inner nodes are stored in a modified SML.
The SML is modified in a way to support the tree structure of
the validation data, i.e. it is no longer a linear list of measure-
ment values but the data structure must support standard tree
operations and traversals. For efficient search during platform
validation, the SML must support the addition of new leaves
and retain edge relations. Adding a new measurement at a leaf
to the tree at depth d requires recalculation of all d − 1 inner
nodes of the leaf’s reduced hash tree and the tree root which
is stored in a V ∈ V. A Merkle tree has a natural colouring
of edges as “left”, respectively, “right” ones, since the binary
extend operation (1), is non-commutative. Leaves inherit this
order and are added from left to right. The binary, d-digit rep-
resentation of leaf n, 0 ≤ n ≤ 2d − 1, denoted by 〈n〉, yields
natural coordinates for the inner nodes and edges on the unique
path from leaf to root. That is, the k-th digit (counted from the
MSB, k = 1, . . . , d), 〈n〉k, determines whether the node at depth
k − 1 on this path is connected by a left, respectively, a right
edge, by 〈n〉k = 0, or, 〈n〉k = 1, respectively.
We make the following assumptions: (1) the root of every
subtree created during the execution of the algorithm must al-
ways be stored securely in a V ∈ V. (2) If two subtrees (mea-
surement values are subtrees of depth 0) with the same depth
d′ exist, they can be merged to a single tree of depth d′ + 1.
(3) The merge operation must preserve assumption (1), i.e., one
of the two V protecting the roots of the subtrees is freed after
the merge operation. Using these assumptions, the update al-
gorithm for a newly arriving measurement value can be formu-
lated such that registers V1, . . . ,Vd−1 always contain the current
state of “active” subtrees of depth d, . . . , 1, and in particular
Vd is affected by the incoming measurement values of compo-
nents. “Active” here means a subtree the root of which awaits
Algorithm 1 Tree formation algorithm
Require: V1, . . . ,Vd ∈ V, m ∈ {0, 1}160
Ensure: V1, . . . ,Vd = nil . Initialise subtree roots empty.
1: n← 0
2: while (m← RoTM) , nil do . Get new measurement.
3: m→ SML . If non-empty, add as new leaf.
4: if 〈n〉d = 1 then . A value arriving from right
5: Vd ← Vd  m . extends the first inner node,
6: Vd → SML . which is purged to the SML.
7: k ← d − 1 . Update subtrees of depth 2, . . .,
8: while (〈n〉k = 1) ∧ (k > 0) do . while coming from
right
9: Vk ← Vk  Vk+1
10: Vk → SML
11: k ← k − 1
12: end while
13: if k = 0 then
14: return “tree full”
15: end if
16: Vk ← Vk+1
17: else . If it is arriving from the left,
18: Vd ← m . updates the first inner node,
19: end if
20: n← n + 1
21: end while
completion by merging its two completed child subtrees. Care
is taken in the formulation so that only the actual measurement
value, protected registers, and the normal extend operation are
used, and no unprotected memory places are involved. Denote
an empty node in the full binary tree of depth d by nil. The tree
formation is performed by Algorithm 1.
If n < 2d, the tree is incomplete at the right edge, and the
cleanup procedure shown in Algorithm 2 is then needed. Algo-
rithm 2 results in a final merge of roots such that V1 ultimately
contains all subtree information. Note that this cleanup proce-
dure is only reached if the tree is not already full, due to the
test in lines 13–15 of algorithm 1. The rule by which the tree
is completed is that the configuration shown in Figure 7 is cor-
rect at the right edge. All non-nil inner nodes are written to the
SML, even if they are the result of forwarding along a left edge
(entailing minor redundancy). Formally, the above rule corre-
sponds may be interpreted as modifying the notion of the ‘’
operation such that x  nil = x, as explained in Appendix A.
It is interesting to note that, if leaves and inner nodes are ap-
pended to the SML in the order prescribed by Algorithm 1, a
natural serialisation of the resulting tree is obtained. This order
is shown in Figure 8 for an incomplete tree of depth 3. The
marked entries 10 and 11 in the resulting SML are identical,
since 11 is created by a forward operation of the cleanup algo-
x
x nil
Figure 7: Default configuration of nodes at the right edge of a tree-formed SML.
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Algorithm 2 Cleanup of an incomplete tree
22: for k ← k − 1 to 1 do
23: if 〈n〉k = 1 then
24: Vk ← Vk  Vk+1
25: Vk → SML
26: else
27: Vk ← Vk+1
28: Vk → SML
29: end if
30: end for
rithm 2. The cleanup algorithm writes nodes 10, 11, and finally
the root 12 to the SML. Note that the leaf 9 has already been
written to the SML in the last run of Algorithm 1.
The SML order can be used to address tree nodes in the SML
by a binary search. Given a sequence number K in the SML
of length 2d+1 − 1, such a search proceeds from the root, which
is the last entry. The remaining 2d+1 − 2 entries are equally
partitioned into portions of size 2d − 1, and it is decided if K is
in the left or right part. This procedure is iterated until K points
to the rightmost element in the current part. The sequence of
decisions made yields the sequence of left-right edges leading
from the root to the node with index K in the SML.
The tree-formation algorithm can easily be adapted to trees
of arbitrary, uniform, arity, say b. For this, the binary coordinate
〈n〉 has to be replaced by the b-ary coordinate 〈n〉(b) and its d-
th, respectively, k-th digit evaluated in line 4, respectively, 8 of
algorithm 1, where the evaluated expression has to be changed
to 〈n〉(b)d = b−1, respectively, 〈n〉k = b−1. Algorithm 2 has to be
adapted accordingly. A further generalisation to arbitrary trees
requires only establishment of the associated node coordinates,
i.e., of the mapping n→ node.
4.2. Maximum Tree Capacity
It is clear from the generation procedure that, with a limited
number, V1, . . . ,Vr, of verification data registers, only a finite
number of components at the leaves of trees can be covered. In
contrast, the hash chain created by the standard, linear extend,
ending in a single PCR value, is in principle of unlimited length.
The maximum capacity of trees generated with r root registers
can be calculated as follows. The procedure for the first register,
V1, can use the r − 1 other registers as a pipeline of length r − 1
to build a tree of depth r. When V1 is occupied, the second
register can support a tree of depth r − 1, and so on, until the
last register, Vr, for which the pipeline has length 0 and the tree
depth 1. Thus the total number of leaves carried by the trees of
12
7
3
1 2
6
4 5
11
10
8 9
nil
nil nil
Figure 8: Order of nodes in a tree-formed SML.
all registers is
Ctrees =
r∑
k=1
2k = 2r+1 − 2. (4)
For r = 24, the number of PCRs of a TPM adherent to the
v 1.2 specification, this yields 33, 554, 430 places for compo-
nent measurements at the leaves of the r trees. If restricted to
the last 16 PCRs, since, for instance, according to the PC Client
specification of the TCG [2] PCRs 0–7 are reserved, (4) still
counts 131, 070 measurements (see Section 5 for a discussion
of implementation issues with standard TPMs). Since the num-
ber of measurements to be taken during start up or at run-time
is not a priori known, the last register can, as a fallback, be
linearly extended after the capacity limit is reached. Figure 9
shows this arrangement.
V1
· · ·
m m
· · ·
· · ·
· · · · · ·
m m

r, . . . ,
Vr−1
m m m m
, Vr
m m · · · m
Figure 9: Maximum capacity arrangement of tree verification data. Measure-
ment values at the leaves are indicated as m.
4.3. Complexity of Tree Formation
The spatial complexity of the tree formation algorithm is
very small. As internal data needs precisely three locations:
d ∈ {1, . . . , r}, n ∈ {0, . . . , 2d − 1}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the size of
that data is at most d + 2dlog2 de ≤ r + 2dlog2 re Bits. Addition-
ally, depending on implementation one register may be required
to receive and hold the current measurement value, and/or as an
intermediate register for the operations on verification data reg-
isters. The SML increases moderately in size. For a completely
filled binary tree of depth d, 2d+1 − 2 node values, including
leaf measurements, are stored in the SML (the root node is con-
tained in a Vi). That is, the tree-formed SML is less than double
the size of the linearly formed SML containing only measure-
ment values.
For an estimation of the temporal complexity, we consider
a full tree of depth d, i.e., 2d leaf measurements. The various
operations involved in algorithm 1 are
M Add measurement to Vd; Vd ← m.
S V Store a verification data register to SML; Vk → SML.
S m Store measurement to SML; m→ SML.
V Copy verification data register; Vk ← Vk+1.
E1 Extend Vd with measurement; Vd ← Vd  m.
E2 Extend inner node registers; Vk ← Vk  Vk+1.
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The symbols introduced in the list items above denote the exe-
cution times of the described operations. The one missing op-
eration m← RoTM can be subsumed in S m.
By the structure of the tree, the occurrences of the operations
are easily counted. S m occurs at each leaf, i.e, 2d times. E1 and
M occur at each inner node at depth d − 1, i.e., 2d−1 times. V
and E2 occur at each inner node from depth d − 2 upward, i.e.,
2d−1 − 1 times. Finally, S V occurs at each inner node of the tree
except the root, which remains in V1. That is, S V occurs 2d − 2
times. Altogether this yields the estimate
2d−1(E1 + M) + (2d−1 − 1)(V + E2) + 2dS m + (2d − 2)S V
for the algorithm’s execution time, disregarding flow control.
Grouping similar operations {E1, E2}, {M, S V , S m} yields
2d−1(E1 + E2)−E2 + 2d−1(M + 2S V + 2S m)− 2S V + (2d−1 − 1)V.
Assuming that all memory operations are approximately
equally time-consuming and bounded by a common constant
M ≈ S V ≈ 12 S m ≈ 12 V ≤ S ,
(where a factor 2 is included in V for a naı¨ve read/store im-
plementation, and in S m for the missing operation mentioned
above), and likewise for the extend operations
E1 ≈ E2 ≤ E.
Then, a coarse estimate for the temporal complexity of tree for-
mation for d > 1 is
≤ 2d
(
E + 4 12 S
)
− (E + 4S ).
When extend operations are the dominating factor, it is interest-
ing to note that tree formation actually needs one extend opera-
tion less than the linear chain of authenticated boot.
5. Implementation
This section describes implementation options and a con-
crete proof-of-concept implementation for the generation of
tree-formed verification data according to Section 4 within the
reference framework provided by Trusted Computing.
With regard to the tree-formation algorithm itself, to achieve
the same level of security as TCG standard compliant trusted
boot processes, all operations on verification data registers
should run inside the hardware-protected TPM environment.
Most operations of the tree-formation algorithm listed in Sec-
tion 4.3 are, however, are not standard TPM functions. In fact,
only the normal extend operation E1 is an internal standard
function, and S V and S m can be realised by PCR read opera-
tions.
We first discuss the minimal modifications that would be nec-
essary to extend a TPM to turn PCRs into tree-formed verifica-
tion data registers, while the tree-formation algorithm may still
run outside the TPM. Then, we propose a new TPM-internal
command for tree formation1. Finally, we explain the experi-
mental implementation of tree-formation with the TPM emula-
tor [16] integrated in the TPM software emulation environment
ethemba [17].
5.1. Minimal TPM Modifications for Tree-Formation
Let us first take a minimalist approach to implementing
tree-formation and carve out the least changes to a standard
TPM that would enable PCRs for use with the algorithms 1
and 2. This requires implementing only the elementary opera-
tions listed in section 4.3 by TPM commands or modifications
thereof. The core of the algorithm, including the bookkeeping
tasks on registers representing inner nodes’ current states, could
then be realised as a software root of trust for performing tree-
formation in a system integrity measurement process such as
authenticated or secure boot. The soft RoTM for tree formation
can for example be realised in a late-launch compartment using
for instance Intel’s TXT or ARM TrustZone technologies.
The operations S V and S m pose no problem and can be re-
alised by TPM PCRRead commands or directly in the tree for-
mation software, respectively. E1 occurs at every right edge
at the lowest level of the tree, and extends a V already con-
taining a measurement value which came from the left sib-
ling of the measurement which is extended into V . Therefore,
E1 is precisely the standard TPM Extend operation defined by
(1). E2 also occurs at right edges inside the tree and, in turn,
is straightforwardly modelled by TPM PCRRead followed by a
TPM Extend.
Operations M and V occur at left edges on the lowest level
of, respectively, inside the tree. They pose a particular problem
for two reasons. First PCRs cannot be directly written to, and
a natural approach to reset them via TPM PCR Reset as a first
step in M or V is problematic, since only PCRs above 16 of a
standard TPM can be reset, and only from the correct locality.
Thus it is necessary that enough PCRs are resettable and that
they respond to the locality in which the tree-formation soft-
ware is executed as a trusted code. Secondly, even after reset,
the only operation which can modify a PCR, TPM Extend, does
not directly copy a value into the register but truly executes (1)
with the existing value of the reset PCR, which is 160bit bi-
nary 0x00 and the input value, which yields a result different
from the input value. One option, which avoids exposing new
commands directly writing to, or shifting values between PCRs,
would be to augment PCRs with a reset flag which indicates
that they are in a pristine state after reset. Then, TPM Extend
can be modified such that it directly writes into the PCR when
this flag is true, and then sets it to false.
Realising that M and V consistently occur at left edges of a
tree, and only if the right sibling is empty (nil), and then de-
terministically produce an outcome depending only on the two
siblings involved, a third option would be to deviate slightly
1A third variant, which is not further discussed here is a software-based
implementation of tree-formed verification data, where the root registers are
soft registers managed by a trusted application, and where the current state of
such registers is protected by a ‘real’ register, e.g., a PCR.
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(0  x)  y
x y
Figure 10: Hash configuration at one tree node depending on children values.
from the definition of a Merkle hash tree. The correct con-
figuration of values in every elementary triangle in the SML
tree would then be as shown in Figure 10. That is V or M is
modelled by TPM PCR Reset followed by TPM Extend to ob-
tain 0  x = H(0‖x) in the first step. The right sibling is then
normally extended in that register and the result written to the
SML. See Appendix A for a consistent treatment of nil node
values in intermediate stages and finalisation of a tree.
5.2. TPM Tree Extend
The split TPM/software implementation of tree formation
compromises on the security level of the resulting root verifi-
cation data register values. It is preferable that tree-formed ver-
ification data is produced by a TPM-internal implementation
of the proposed algorithms. For this, a TPM modification can
work as follows. The modified TPM exposes a new command
TPM Tree Extend with the same input parameters as the usual
TPM Extend command. The TPM maintains flags for PCRs
signifying which of them are currently designated tree roots,
which are occupied and locked, and which are usable as inter-
mediate Vs by the algorithm. Furthermore, the TPM maintains
the additional data mentioned in Section 4.3. In the simplest
case, internal logic prevents concurrent use of more than one
PCR for tree formation. While TPM Extend outputs only the
update of the target PCR value, TPM Tree Extend returns a
variable number 1, . . . , d of updated verification register data
values in sequence such that they produce the natural order de-
scribed in Section 4.1. These return values are the output of the
SML write operations of algorithms 1 and 2. When d values are
returned, the receiver knows that this tree is exhausted and the
corresponding root V locked. Another option not considered
here is for TPM Tree Extend to return all intermediate Vs on
each call.
5.3. Experimental Performance
We have implemented the tree-formation procedure by in-
troducing the new command TPM Tree Extend descibed in
Section 5.2 in the TPM software emulation environment
ethemba [17] containing the TPM emulator [16]. For simplic-
ity, the number of available PCRs in the emulator was increased
and some (24) of them were exclusively assigned for use with
the TPM Tree Extend command. Modifications to the soft-
ware environment of the TPM emulator were also necessary. In
particular a new object TcTpmTreeDigest was defined in the
TSS implementation jTSS [18] to receive the multiple return
values from the tree formation algorithm. The TPM-emulator-
internal implementation allows for an estimation of the relative
size of the required code of the tree-formation algorithms. The
TPM Tree Extend command adds 271 logical (excluding com-
ment and blank) lines of code (LoC) to the 21,756 logical LoC
of the TPM emulator, i.e., about 1.3%.
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Figure 11: Histogram counts of execution times of TPM Extend and
TPM Tree Extend for 215 (red) 217 (green), and 219 (blue) input measurement
values.
To get an impression of the tree-formation algorithm’s per-
formance, random, 160-Bit values were generated and directly
fed into TPM Tree Extend inside the jTSS. These random val-
ues were thus treated as (artificially generated) test-case mea-
surement values and execution times were measured using the
SystemNanoTime function. Samples were taken over 215, 217,
and 219 input measurement values, and over a number of indi-
vidual runs, with each run starting from a freshly booted emu-
lation system residing on a hardware platform with a 2,8GHz
processor. The number of runs was chosen such that the total
number of execution time measurements is 100 · 219. The aver-
age time, over all samples, of TPM Tree Extend was ≈ 218µs,
while that of TPM Extend was ≈ 125µs.
The distribution of the execution times for TPM Extend (left
peaks) and TPM Tree Extend (right peaks) is shown in Fig-
ure 11. It is visible that, with the soft TPM emulation, the calcu-
lation of hash values is dominated by data handling in the emu-
lator and the jTSS environment. Essentially, TPM Tree Extend
has to handle, in particular during output to the SML, about
double the data than TPM Extend. Some initial effects, proba-
bly due to memory management, tend to wash out as the sample
length increases.
6. Related Work
Verification of programs before loading and while booting
was first mentioned in [19, Sections 6.2 and 6.3], where a for-
malisation of the process is given and the concept of attesta-
tion appears. Code authentication is among the primary goals
of Trusted Computing [20, 21, 22]. Early work on protect-
ing executed code by securing start up of a platform, such as
Dyad [23], proposes hardware mechanisms to bootstrap trust in
the host with secure coprocessors on standard PC hardware, and
shows the first important applications of trusted platforms. Se-
cure hardware must be involved in the secure bootstrap process.
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For instance, a secure coprocessor may halt the boot process if
it detects an anomaly. This assumes that the bootstrap ROM
is secure. To ensure this, the system’s address space could be
configured such that the boot vector and the boot code are pro-
vided by a secure coprocessor directly or the boot ROM itself
could be a piece of secure hardware. Regardless, a secure co-
processor verifies the system software (OS kernel, system re-
lated user-level software) by checking the software’s signature
against known values [23].
Tamper resistance of code has been considered by many re-
searchers. A prototypical approach to the problem is rooting
trust for program execution in hardware, such as the XOM (eX-
ecute Only Memory [24]) processor architecture, and the XOM
Operating System [25] building on it. This does not solve the
problems of secure loading a program, and attesting to external
entities. AEGIS [26] shows secure boot on a PC. AEGIS uses
a signed hash to identify each layer in the boot process, as does
Terra [27], which can attest loaded components with a complete
chain of certificates ending in attestation of virtual machines.
Existing TCG specifications define a bi-lateral remote attes-
tation to verify the integrity of a platform remotely, by verifying
the binary executables. All executed code is measured when it
gets loaded. The measurements are stored in PCRs as verifi-
cation data, and the TPM attests to these data by signing them
with a TPM protected key. The verifier can, upon receipt of
these metrics, decide if the platform can be considered trust-
worthy. Since the whole configuration is transmitted and ver-
ified, the verifier needs to know all configurations of all ma-
chines. Furthermore, binary attestation discloses the complete
configuration and thus poses a privacy risk. In [28] and [29, 30]
“property,” respectively, “property-based attestation” (PBA) are
proposed. PBA allows to assure the verifier of security proper-
ties of the verified platform without revealing detailed configu-
ration data. A trusted third party (TTP) is used to issue a cer-
tificate which maps the platform’s configuration to the proper-
ties (in particular desired/undesired functionality) which can be
fulfilled in this configuration. The TPM can then, using a zero-
knowledge proof, attest these properties to the verifier without
disclosing the complete configuration. Essentially, PBA moves
the infrastructural problem of platform validation to a TTP, sim-
ilarly to, but extending the role of, the TCG’s privacy CA.
Another alternative is presented by the Nexus OS [31] which
builds on a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) to estab-
lish strong isolation between user space and privileged pro-
grams. Nexus has secure memory regions and monitoring and
enforcement machines to protect them. One application is to
move device drivers into user space [32]. Attestation by Nexus
attaches descriptive labels to monitored programs and thus al-
lows for expressiveness similar to PBA, but intrinsic to the sys-
tem. Both the PBA concept, as well as the Nexus approach do
not have means to validate a complex system comprised of a
multitude of components, which furthermore shall be dynami-
cally managed. Both approaches are orthogonal to the present
one, and could be combined with it.
Hierarchical Integrity Management (HIM), see [33], presents
a dynamical framework for component-wise integrity measure-
ment and policy-enabled management of platform components.
Components and sub-components are related in HIM via depen-
dency graphs, the most general structure that is useful for this
purpose [34, 35]. But HIM is not aimed at (remote) platform
validation and does not protect structured platform verification
data in a PCR. Rather, it holds measurements in a global Com-
ponent Configuration Register table of soft registers.
The main intended application of the hash trees introduced
by Merkle for integrity protection of large datasets is in cer-
tificate management in a PKI. This yields long-term account-
ability of CAs, using Merkle trees [36], or authenticated search
trees [37]. Various groups have extended the use of hash trees
to general long-term secure archiving for digital data [38, 39].
Corresponding data structures have been standardised in the so-
called Evidence Record Syntax, by the IETF [40].
A lot of research work has gone into the usage of hash trees
for run-time memory protection. See Elbaz et al. [41] and Hu et
al. [42] for a recent topical overviews over the state-of-the-art.
Typical systems employing hash trees for storage and memory
protection [43, 44, 45] separate a system into untrusted storage
and a TCB. A program running on the TCB uses hash trees to
maintain the integrity of data stored in untrusted storage, which
can be, e.g., some easily accessible, bulk store in which the
program regularly stores and loads data which does not fit into
the TCB. Gassend, et al. [44] also propose to store the root of
the entire tree in an on-chip trusted register of constant size, but
keep all other nodes are in main memory or cache.
Regarding structuring of validation data beyond the simple
linear verification data chain, some attempts have been made.
The specifications of the TCG Infrastructure working group
contain an approach to the problem of remotely validating a
TCG Trusted Platform, creating a hierarchy of components and
sub-components [7], in a nested XML validation data struc-
ture. Although this data structure may contain PCR values in
the substructures, no binding by cryptographic means between
those substructures, or substructures and parent structures, is
foreseen.
On the academic side, Lo Presti [46] proposed a Tree of Trust
(ToT) concept and notation to represent a platform’s structure.
A ToT’s nodes represent platform components, from TPM up
to applications, annotated with trust and security statements. It
can be used to assess the trust that should be put into the plat-
form, or even to reorganise the platform according to certain
constraints. Another technical domain where the shortcomings
of a merely linear chain of trust becomes an urgent issue is vir-
tualisation. Virtual machines are created and destroyed dynam-
ically on potentially many layers, resulting in “a tree-like, dy-
namic structure of trust dependencies” [47, p. 6]. While the
community has acknowledged that structured validation data is
required to truly assess platforms’ trustworthiness, a granular
association of such tree-formed data hierarchies to verification
data (PCR values) is lacking.
The work most closely related to the present one is consti-
tuted by the proposal of Sarmenta, van Dijk, et al. [48], to pro-
tect arbitrary memory objects via hash trees which in turn are
protected by a root in TPM non volatile memory. In [48] a new
TPM command TPM ExecuteHashTree is introduced which
allows to add, delete, and update so called TPM COUNTER BLOB
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objects, and which issues a certificate, signed by an AIK, that
attests to the successful verification of that object’s data with re-
spect to the hash tree’s root. While this is a fully general method
for handling arbitrary data sets in a TPM-protected hash tree, it
does not address the special problem of building the tree from
sequentially arriving measurement values maintaining the same
security properties as the normal TPM Extend command.
A different usage of hash trees is proposed in [49], where it is
shown how they can support authentication of distributed code
in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Also in WSN, data ag-
gregation involving multiple nodes may be integrity protected
using hash trees [50]. Different from hash trees, another poten-
tial approach to make verification data searchable are Authen-
ticated Append-only Skip Lists [51], which are sorted linked
lists designed to allow fast lookup of the stored data elements
by taking ”shortcuts.” However, trees are better suited for vali-
dation of a platform’s state, in particular to efficiently determine
the subset of components at the leaves failing validation.
Relative to the cited state-of-the-art, the contributions of the
present paper are twofold. First, we introduce a new method
to generate a binary Merkle tree from component measurement
values using only a limited set of tamper-resistant verification
data registers, and existing capabilities of the TPM, i.e., the
standard extend operation. The algorithm is small enough to
be executed within a TCB, in particular on-chip. This part of
our proposed method increases security of the generation of
the root of a hash tree, which in turn provides more security
to the tree nodes. This problem is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, not considered in the literature. Second, we show how to
exploit the tree structure for efficient validation with enhanced
diagnostic capabilities over common PCR values and SMLs,
to increase security features of remote platform validation, and
concurrently benefiting from the efficiency of tree-like struc-
tures in the search for failure points. This use of tree-structured
data for secure diagnostics, validation, or attestation (all fields
to which the proposed concepts apply), has also not been con-
sidered elsewhere, to the best of our knowledge.
7. Discussion, Outlook, and Conclusion
Though hash trees are widely used, ours is the first proposal,
to the best of our knowledge, to use Merkle hash trees to protect
the integrity of the secure start up process of a trusted platform
in the same way as is traditionally done with PCRs. We have
demonstrated the efficiency and flexibility gains resulting from
using tree-formed verification data in platform validation. This
may be effective in particular in the remote validation and man-
agement of platforms via a network. Given the small size and
complexity of the tree-formation algorithm, it seems possible
to implement all these operations directly inside the TPM, if
specifications are amended accordingly. This may or may not
be a feasible approach for future TPM generations,depending
also on industry interests. It could be that the specifications of
the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM, [3]) have more flexibility
toward incorporation of such advanced functionality.
Although the discussion framework for tree-formed verifi-
cation data is that of Trusted Computing, the main motiva-
tion for this work comes from a different angle. Future, large
scale deployments of networked devices, such as required in
machine-to-machine communication scenarios, require a solid
device- and network-side, balanced and efficient trust infras-
tructure [1, 52]. Security requirements are particularly high
for devices loosely connected to networks and operating semi-
autonomously. Scenarios considered by the industry [53], in
particular regarding machine-to-machine (M2M) communica-
tion of rather autonomously operating devices, always lead to
the requirement for remote integrity check, or validation, of a
connecting device. To make validation expressive, efficient,
and secure, is a primary necessity. In fact, a variety of cryp-
tographic checksum functions is available for checking code
and data , and all variants obviously require that the integrity
of the checksums for the ”correct” data be maintained. The re-
quirement for a centralised database of all software in all valid
versions on the various machines is a significant management
problem, in need of an efficient solution. A “work-around”
which, however, incurs a loss of granularity in platform val-
idation, is obviously to check only system parts considered
security-sensitive, such as a secure OS loader or a hypervi-
sor. On the other hand, the proposed approach to validation
using tree-formed data promises increased scalability for such
use cases. The natural hierarchy of trees suggests natural com-
binations with analogously hierarchical network architectures,
e.g., where large numbers of (rather uniform or representing a
limited number of device classes) M2M devices are connected
via gateways to networks. According validation architectures
and procedures are described in [54].
A further variant of validation with tree-formed data can save
communication overhead by straightforwardly turning the tree-
traversal of diagnostic validation into an interactive procedure
between platform and validator. This allows to send only the
data actually required for traversal, level by level, to the valida-
tor, and thus restrict communication to a minimum. This is de-
scribed in [55]. A demonstration implementation in which an
emulated Android platform is the validation target, shows the
feasibility of the concept of interactive remote validation with
tree-formed verification data This demonstration can be viewed
at [17].
With regard to generalisations, trees are certainly not the
most general structures for which integrity protection using
cryptographic digests can be applied. For instance, some re-
searchers have extended hashes to provide identification of di-
rected graphs [56]. Others have applied variations of one-way
functions, e.g., multi-set hashes [14] to uniquely identify com-
plex data structures such as RDF graphs [57]. Along these lines,
generalisation of tree-formed verification data to, for instance,
directed acyclic graphs, and dependence graphs [34, 35] can
be conceived. While potentially interesting for complex plat-
form management and protection tasks, every such generalisa-
tion would incur increased complexity and lose the efficiency
of binary trees for validation.
Also on the device side, the hierarchical structure of trees
suggests improvements for validation. A natural one is to de-
fine various assurance levels for verification data beyond the
protected/unprotected dichotomy. For instance, higher levels
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of verification data trees could be kept in software (e.g. using
virtualisation) or hardware protected regions of memory. Such
architectural extensions may also allow to use the tree-formed
approach for different kinds of start up procedures than “cold
boot” only.
The single command extension of the TPM integrity mea-
surement functionality, TPM Tree Extend proposed above is,
however, only the starting point of a flexible, TPM-based tree
verification data management architecture. In particular it
would be desirable to enable secure updates of subtree roots,
for instance for dynamic platform management, and ultimately
to quote an inner node of a tree-formed SML with the same
security assertions as TPM Quote provides to a remote valida-
tor for a PCR value. Finally, a desired feature is the ability to
certify subtrees via a TTP, as discussed in Section 3.3. Such
extensions are described in [15].
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Appendix A. A Useful Convention
In many cases, the hash tree stored in the SML will be in-
complete, i.e., contain empty leaves and inner nodes. In the
continuous measurement process, such nodes, with value de-
noted nil, are treated procedurally by the operations M and V
(see Section 4.3) which means that right nil siblings are ignored.
This happens in lines 18 and 16 of Algorithm 1 for intermedi-
ate stages of tree formation, and in line 27 of Algorithm 2 at
completion of the tree after the last measurement.
Generally, i.e., transgressing the restrictions of a standard
TPM, it may be useful to assume that nil is a two-sided unit
for the operation , i.e.,
x  nil = nil  x = x, and nil  nil = nil.
This convention is in accordance with the rule for validation
of node configuration Fig.5 (d). It is a re-interpretation of the
usual extend operation and can also be used to eliminate the op-
erations M and V in the algorithms’ formulations. Namely, M
and V can be replaced by a reset of a register V to nil followed
by the operation V ← V  m, respectively V ← V  V ′.
For the implementation of this convention, we may assume
that nil is to be represented as an additional flag of PCR reg-
isters, and the inputs and output of . For a PCR, the nil flag
is set by a particular reset command. When nil is encountered
as the input of an extend operation to a PCR, then logic of the
TSS, or a TPM modification, may prevent execution of the hash
operation (1) and write to the PCR directly.
Appendix B. The Expected Number of Bad Inner Nodes
The problem under consideration is that of bi-colouring (bad
vs. good inner nodes) of a binary tree generated by a random,
i.i.d. choice of leaves and colouring of the path connecting it to
the root. Random choices of such leaves and paths is equivalent
to random choices of i.i.d. bit strings of length d. We first calcu-
late the expected number ENk of coloured leaves after k choices
from the set of N = 2d leaves. Recursively, EN0 = 0, and
ENk+1 = E
N
k
ENk
N
+ (ENk + 1)
1 − ENk
N
= 1 + ENk −
ENk
N
.
Solving this obtains
ENk = N
(
1 −
(
1 − N−1
)k)
.
Since all substrings of the chosen bit-strings are statistically in-
dependent the same argument applies to inner nodes at all levels
d−1, . . . , 0. Thus, the expected number of coloured inner nodes
is obtained by summation
Einnerk =
d−1∑
`=0
E2
`
k .
It remains to find the expected number of choices k which cor-
responds to a certain expected number ENk = f N of coloured
leaves, where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 is a target fraction of leaves. Solving
this equation for k yields
k =
ln(1 − f )
ln(1 − 2−d) ,
where N = 2d was inserted. From this, the expected number
of bad inner nodes in dependency of f , Einner( f ), can be calcu-
lated.
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